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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 




BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant claims jurisdiction for this appeal per § 78-
2a-3(d), UCA. Appellee challenges the jurisdiction of this court 
per § 77-18a-l(2), UCA, and Rule 26(3), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure as set forth in argument hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the State barred from an appeal on statutory 
and/or constitutional grounds? 
2. May a defendant's refusal to waive a right not to 
give evidence against himself be used to establish probable cause 
for an arrest and/or infer guilt? 
3. May this court disturb the ruling of the court 
below which found insufficient probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol? 
1 
4. Irrespective of the foregoing issues, in light of 
State v, Sims, infra, should this court dismiss the appeal on 
independent grounds where the State would be unable on remand to 
convict Defendant? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, AND RULES 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I, Section 12 (in pertinent parts) 
. • • • The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; • . • nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Article I, Section 25 
This enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others retained by 
the people* 
Article I, Section 26 
The provisions of this Constitution are man-
datory and prohibitory, unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Article I, Section 27 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual 
rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
S 41-6-44.20 (2) (In pertinent part) 
A person may not keep, carry possess trans-
port, or allow another to keep, carry, 
possess, or transport in the passenger com-
partment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle 
is on any highway, any container which 
contains any alcoholic beverage if the 
container has been opened, its seal broken, 
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or the contents of the container partially 
consumed* 
§ 76-1-403 (In pertinent parts) 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for 
one or more offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising 
out of the same criminal episode is barred 
if: 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in ac-
quittal; 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution 
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the 
trier of facts or in a determination that 
there was insufficient evidence to warrant 
conviction. . • • 
77-18a-l(2) and Rule 26(3), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Identical Text). (In pertinent parts). 
An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because 
of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of a 
speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court 
holding a statute or any part of it 
invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting 
a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for 
review, the appellate court decides 
that the appeal would be in the 
interest of justice; . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the State from a criminal case in 
which the defendant was acquitted of the sole charge of "open 
container in a vehicle." (The State characterizes the appeal to 
be from, alternately, a "dismissal" and an order granting Defen-
dant's "motion to suppress." 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case was originally filed by citation in Duchesne 
County Justice Court (R#l) then re-filed by Information in the 
Eighth Circuit County (sic) (read "Court"), Duchesne County/ 
Department, Judge A. Lynn Payne, presiding. 
Appellant asserts in its brief (p.3) that Defendant 
filed a pre-trial Motion to Suppress but sought no pre-trial 
ruling thereon. However, the record herein is devoid of any such 
motion. In fact, the record contains a Motion to Dismiss on the 
grounds that the search of Defendant's vehicle was performed 
absent probable cause for the arrest upon which the search was 
predicated. (R.9). 
At the beginning of the trial herein, on March 22, 
1990, Defendant's counsel requested the court to consider the 
prospective evidence both as to the motion to dismiss and the 
merits of the case in chief. The State made no objection and in 
fact stipulated to said procedure: 
"THE COURT: All right. Then with the permission 
of the parties, the Court will consider the motion as 
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the case is presented to the court." 
(Trial Transcript, R.057, 1. 15-17.) 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
After receiving all the State's evidence in the case, 
both sides rested. (T. Tr. R. 108) The court thereafter entered 
its judgment, findings of fact and conclusions of law which were 
embodied in a document entitled, "RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL", dated August 14, 1990, (R. 028-034), 
wherein the court states in the last sentence, "(T)he Court 
finds reasonable doubt as to the crime charged and finds the 
defendant not guilty. (Emphasis added). (R. 028). The State 
has appealed from said judgment. 
D. FACTS 
On May 12, 1989, on SR-40, in Duchesne County, Utah, 
Defendant's vehicle was among several which were stopped in a 
roadblock. Deputy Wendall Roberts made personal contact with 
Defendant. Based solely on a detectable odor of alcohol emanat-
ing from Defendant, he ordered Defendant to pull off the roadway 
for further investigation. (R. 033, paragraph 3). 
Upon further investigation, during which time the 
defendant declined to perform field sobriety tests, (R. 033, 
paragraph 4 - R. 032, paragraph 11), Deputy Roberts concluded 
that "except for the odor of alcohol, there was no other indica-
tion that the defendant was intoxicated." (R. 034, paragraph 11, 
last sentence.) 
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Trooper Mervin Gustin, Utah Highway Patrol, who was 
stationed a considerable distance from Defendant and Deputy 
Roberts, nonetheless made the observation (though not noticed by 
Roberts) that Defendant was walking in a suspicious manner. 
Moreover, based upon Gustinfs "experience" and because Defendant 
had refused to take field sobriety tests, Gustin took over the 
investigation. (R. 063, 070). At this point, even before ac-
costing the defendant, Trooper Gustin called his supervisors on 
the radio and "explained what we had" whereupon the supervisor 
advised him to arrest the defendant. (R. 064, 1. 1-3). (The 
latter advice was also given by Deputy Roberts as a reason for 
turning the investigation over to Gustin.) (R. 064, 1. 2-4). 
Gustin immediately approached Defendant and asked him 
to take the field sobriety tests. Defendant "told me he didn't 
have to, to show me in the law where he had to do any field 
sobriety tests." (R. 072, 1. 5-7) "I tried to imply the 
Implied Consent Law applied to field sobriety tests and he said 
(the law only applied to) chemical tests." (R.072, 1.20-22). 
Undaunted by Defendant's legal interpretation, Trooper Gustin 
then attempted to obtain a partial field sobriety test (gaze 
nystagmus) by stealth: 
"(B)ut he was careful to only look 
straight ahead. I tried to divert his atten-
tion to the side, so I could observe for 
Nystagmus, but he just put his sunglasses 
back on, . . ." 
(R. 076, 1. 2-5). 
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Immediately following Defendant's refusal to submit to 
field tests and without obtaining or seeking Defendant's consent, 
Gustin walked around to Defendant's passenger door, opened it up, 
removed the lid from a closed cooler and looked inside, finding 
one can of beer* (R. 072, 1. 11-16) The trooper justified the 
intrusion because: 
"I could smell alcohol and I could see 
beers (two empty beer cans) and I had prob-
able cause to believe there was still open 
containers in the vehicle. • • •" 
(R. 095, 1. 24 - R. 096, 1. 1; R. 096, 1. 16-18). 
Thereafter, Gustin said the defendant exhibited pinkish 
eyes, irrational behavior and shaking, that coupled with the odor 
of alcohol, the aforementioned suspicious style of walking and 
the refusal to take field sobriety tests - - "(Y)ou know, I 
thought, well, yeah, (by refusing) he's definitely got something 
to hide here. He's - - that's what people pay me for is to be 
suspicious. . . . " (R.093, 1. 4-6) - - Gustin arrested Defendant 
for DUI. (R. 082, 1. 2,3). 
The defendant submitted to a blood test which, as it 
turned out, contained a blood-alcohol level of .00%. (R. 107, 1. 
23 and R. 083, 1. 21-25) Needless to say, the DUI charge was 
dismissed well before trial on the instant charge although the 
record doesn't provide dates or details. 
Shortly following the arrest, Defendant's vehicle was 
impounded and an inventory was conducted by Deputy Rich Harrison 
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per Trooper Gustin's direction and the "open container," i.e., 
the single partially empty beer can was found and held for evi-
dence, the same being offered at the trial herein. (R. 098-100). 
The record is replete with references to Defendant 
"Bob" McRae's notoriety both as an adversary to the police ("DUI" 
defense attorney); as being blessed with somewhat Lilliputian 
social graces and as having a less than pristine reputation 
concerning his familiarity with distilled spirits: 
(Deputy Roberts)". . . .Mr. McRae being known as 
a DUI attorney, and I knew that he was - -" 
(R. 063, 1. 8,9). 
(Trooper Gustin, on seeing Roberts talking to "Bob 
McRae") "And I thought, I'm sure glad it's Wendall 
(Roberts) and not me." 
(R. 070, 1. 25). 
(Gustin)". . . . I've never had anybody ever 
refuse to do field sobriety tests for me before, and as 
potential - - especially an attorney who's made a 
living defending DUI's, I just couldn't imagine him 
doing anything to deter and officer from arresting 
DUIs, unless he has something to hide. . . . " 
(R.079, 1. 17-22). 
(Gustin, on dealing with McRae in court)". . . . 
I've had a steady diet of him it seems like. . . . 
(R. 090, 1. 13, 14). 
"The defendant was recognized by all law enforce-
ment officers who dealt with him as being a prominent 
criminal defense attorney in this area." 
(R.033, paragraph 1). 
Q. Mr. McRae can occasionally be loud and in-
timidating, can he not? 
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A. Very intimidating to me, yes. 
Q. How about loud? 
A. Yes* 
Q. Sometimes abusive* 
A* Yes* 
(R. 093, 1. 15-21) 
(Additional references deleted include the examination 
of Gustin regarding other encounters with Defendant wherein 
Defendant acted similarly to his actions as when arrested herein/ 
other occasions Gustin suspected Defendant had been drinking 
and/or smelled of alcohol/ references by counsel and judge com-
paring Defendant's shaking to behavior symptomatic of an 
alcoholic being deprived of alcohol, etc.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Irrespective of the label the court put on the title 
page of its ruling, it expressly acquitted Defendant at trial. 
Moreover, the facts herein demonstrate that this is a case in 
which Defendant was acquitted and the State is therefor barred, 
per double jeopardy principles, from an appeal in this case. 
Even if an appeal could be had in this case the ruling 
of the court below: (1) declaring evidence of Defendant's re-
fusal to submit to a field sobriety test not to create a negative 
inference re impairment, and/ (2) absent the field test refusal 
evidence there was insufficient probable cause to arrest Defen-
dant, were correct and may not be disturbed on appeal. 
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Furthermore, this case should be dismissed under the 
recent decisions of the appellate courts of this state respecting 
unlawful police roadblock stops• 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL 
The State claims the right to appeal herein from a 
"final judgment of dismissal" per § 77-18A-1, U.C.A. and because 
it preserved its right to appeal at trial. 
The State's claims demonstrate a misapprehension of the 
law, a misrepresentation of the record and a clear ignorance of 
the express language of the trial court's ruling. 
A. THE COURT ACQUITTED DEFENDANT 
"(T)he Court finds reasonable doubt as 
to the crime charged and finds the defendant 
not guilty." (R. 028). 
The State ignores the above language and instead refers 
only to the title of the written ruling, i.e., " . . . ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL." State v. Willard, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App. 
1990), holds that where the trial court's ruling is based upon 
the sufficiency of the evidence ruled admissable at trial, al-
though labeled a dismissal, it is nevertheless an acquittal. (At 
46). 
In Willard, the defendant's pre-trial motion to sup-
press was denied but renewed at trial after both sides had 
rested. This time the court granted the motion. Absent the 
suppressed evidence, there was insufficient proof of guilt. 
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In Willard the evidence (drugs) was suppressed due to a 
too lengthy detention following a roadblock• In the case at bar, 
the court excluded a partially-filled beer can after finding 
insufficient probable cause for Defendant's arrest* (Said beer 
can being an essential factual element to the charge of open 
container, § 41-6-44.20.) 
The two cases are indistinguishable; therefor, ir-
respective of the label the State has chosen to embrace, the 
court's ruling herein is a factual resolution in favor of the 
defendant and is an acquittal as a matter of law. Willard, at 
46/ State v* Chuqq, 749 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988); State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983); United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978); § 76-1-403, U.C.A. 
Defendant may not now be subjected to a new trial 
without violating the double jeopardy clause. This is so even 
though the acquittal resulted from an incorrect application of 
the law or an improper determination of the facts. Scott, at 96-
97; Musselman, at 1065; Willard, at 46; Article I, Section 12, 
Utah Constitution. 
B. NO RIGHT OF APPEAL WAS PRESERVED 
Even if preservation of appeal were possible, Appel-
lant's claim to have done so is fallacious. 
At the start of the trial below, the court considered 
Defendant's request to hear evidence on his motion simultaneous 
with the trial on the merits, (as the court is permitted to do 
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per Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure), since the 
testimony in either case was precisely the same. 
Appellant now claims it merely represented to the court 
"that it was familiar with Defendant's motion and was prepared to 
proceed with a hearing on the motion." (Emphasis added/ Appel-
lant's brief, p. 6). Appellant implies that it was agreeing only 
to proceed on the motion, advising the court only that it was 
aware of the defendant's claims and was thereby objecting to the 
joinder of motion and trial or at least preserving the right of 
appeal. 
A review of the record is enlightening, (R. 057), 
wherein the State makes no objection, informs the court that it 
is "sufficiently informed of the defendant's concern to go for-
ward" and, when the court states: "All right. Then with the 
permission of the partiesf the Court will consider the motion as 
the case is presented to the court." (Emphasis added.) 
Did the State object or move to preserve the right to 
appeal? No. The State's response was: "Thank you, your honor." 
(R. 057, 1. 19). 
The State's laymen-like assertion (Appellant's brief, 
p. 6) that, "This is not a case where the defendant was found not 
guilty based on the facts, but was a dismissal based on a * tech-
nicality' " is wholly without merit and its recall of the facts 
at trial is both inaccurate and without reference to the record. 
In its brief at page 7, the State laments the fact the 
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defendant could have appealed an adverse ruling, ergo, "Why not 
the State?" The answer to that question is found in any Con-
stitutional Law hornbook, double jeopardy section. 
This court should summarily bar consideration of the 
State's appeal herein* 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NO NEGATIVE 
INFERENCE MAY BE DRAWN FROM DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL 
TO SUBMIT TO A FIELD SOBRIETY TEST 
The State assigns error to the court finding that the 
defendant had a right to refuse to take field sobriety tests as 
one factor in finding there was insufficient probable cause to 
arrest Defendant for DUI. 
Trooper Gustin interpreted the Implied Consent Law to 
encompass field tests* He also believed his probable cause was 
enhanced by Mr. McRae's refusal to take said tests since it 
showed he had "something to hide." Moreover, as a "DUI attor-
ney," (Gustin concluded), McRae should be held to a higher stan-
dard of cooperation in DUI investigations. (Including, one 
supposes, facilitating the marshalling of evidence against 
oneself.) 
While the Appellant has at least seen clear to divorce 
itself from Gustin's curious legal opinion regarding the Implied 
Consent Law, it has nonetheless asserted an equally erroneous 
point of law. The Statefs brief, at page 8, refers to the "hold-
ing" in Salt Lake Citv v. Carner, 664, P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983): 
11
 The Court . . . held that 'the over-
whelming weight of authority holds that 
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although a suspect or accused cannot be 
'compelled1 to perform roadside or field 
sobriety testy (sic), such tests do not vio-
late an accused's privilege against self-
incrimination because they are non-
testimonial in nature." 
The above guote is found in earner at page 1173 in 
Justice Durham's concurring opinion, not in the majority which 
expressly held: 
". • . (W)e do not reach the question whether 
the taking of field sobriety tests consti-
tutes giving evidence against oneself as 
protected by Article I, Section 12, Utah 
Constitution." 
(Carner, at 1172). 
Following earner; however, the court did rule that 
sobriety tests were non-testimonial in nature and therefor not 
protected by the self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amend-
ment or Article I, Section 12. State v. Erickson, 148 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 45 (Utah App. 1990); American Fork v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 
1069 (Utah 1985). 
But the Erickson case merely concludes that no Miranda 
warning must precede the field sobriety tests nor must the right 
to counsel be afforded. (At 48). It does not, however give 
police the right to compel the tests nor abridge the accused's 
right to refuse to take the tests any more than the police have 
the right to compel a "consent" search even though they may 
obtain the consent to search without warning the accused he has 
the right to refuse a warrantless search. 
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All Erickson says is that field test results, absent a 
Miranda warning are admissable. This is not a case where the 
State seeks to admit the test results. Rather it seeks to admit 
the non-results, i.e; the refusal to submit to the test* Ap-
parently buying into Gustin's "he must have something to hide 
"theory," (whatever happened to the presumption of innocence? ), 
the State wants it both ways: If you take the test we use the 
results as evidence of your guilt; if you don't take the test we 
use your refusal to give us those results as evidence of your 
guilt. 
The State's argument presumes that if an accused cannot 
point to a specific constitutional rights violation, the evidence 
obtained by the police will be admitted; that there is a vacuum 
between an absolute right and no prohibition. 
Article I, Section 12 is not "Utah's Fifth Amendment." 
In fact, it embraces principles found in the United States Con-
stitution in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well as 
enumerating rights and privileges not mentioned anywhere in the 
Bill of Rights. 
Just because Erickson says non-testimonial evidence is 
not protected by the self-incrimination clause, it does not 
follow that the refusal evidence is ipso facto admissable. The 
self-incrimination clause is not a citizen's only protection 
against giving evidence against himself. Nor does Article I, 
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Section 12 limit the right against giving "evidence" against 
oneself to testimonial evidence* 
Unlike chemical tests, no statute gives police the 
right to compel field sobriety tests, (Despite Gustinfs belief 
to the contrary). Therefor, Article I, Section 25 of the state 
constitution must be construed to protect against allowing the 
State to elicit a negative inference from being denied the use of 
evidence it cannot compel: 
This enumeration of rights shall not be con-
strued to impair or deny others retained by 
the people. 
The fundamental principle of our constitution is to 
restrain or prohibit the police power wherever it is in conflict 
with individual rights: 
Article I, Section 26 
The provisions of this Constitution 
are mandatory and prohibitory, un-
less by express words they are 
declared otherwise. 
Article I, Section 27 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles is essential to the sec-
urity of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government. 
The importance of placing restraint on the police power 
is exemplified by examining the actions of Gustin, who: 
1. Provided a citizen (Defendant) with false 
information as to what the law requires re submission 
to field tests; 
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2. Tried to deceive McRae into unwittingly prov-
iding field test information (gaze nystagmus); 
3. Unabashedly cites "probable cause" as his 
basis for his pre-arrest, warrantless, unconsented 
search of Defendant's cooler; 
4. Concludes that lack of cooperation (or ex-
ercising of a right to refuse) indicates a defendant 
has "something to hide." 
Finally, the State points out that officers routinely 
use such inadmissable evidence as "confidential informants" and 
"heresay" (sic) to form probable cause but fails to follow its 
reasoning process into the courtroom* (Where finders of fact 
have the discretion to exclude the evidence derived from such 
information just as is the case here*) 
To allow a negative inference from a refusal to take 
field tests, where the law cannot compel such compliance, is 
tantamount to allowing a defendant's refusal to consent to a 
search of his home to be used as a basis to obtain a search 
warrant therefor* After all, it arguably proves he has "some-
thing to hide"* 
This court has made it perfectly clear that what an 
officer believes is probable cause must be based on something 
more than what the constitution(s) do not prohibit him from 
considering. E.g., the "cocaine lane" stops based upon drivers 
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being Hispanics, out-of-staters, or "nervous", while not neces-
sarily bad logic are often held to be bad (and impermissible) 
police work irrespective of the inability of a defendant to point 
to specific rights violation as to each and every factor used in 
the officer's vest-pocket probable cause determination* 
Defendant urges the court to rule on this issue if for 
no other reason than to guide the Utah Highway Patrol in such a 
way as to ensure that its troopers may be trained to enforce the 
law, as written, as opposed to interpreting the law as they may 
"imply" it to be. 
III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR THE ARREST HEREIN 
Gustin's supervisor(s) instructed him to arrest Defen-
dant when only the following was known to him: 
1. That the defendant had an odor of alcohol 
about him (although Deputy Roberts admittedly found no 
other indicia of impairment); 
2. That Defendant had refused to take the field 
tests, and; 
3. That Gustin (from afar) had observed a suspi-
cious pattern of walking in defendant's gait. 
The intent to arrest Defendant, therefor, was clearly 
established well in advance of when any reasonable person would 
conclude that probable cause had attached, irrespective of the 
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propriety of including the refusal into the probable cause 
equation. 
Gustin ostensibly accepted the supervisory instructions 
in that he proceeded with his "probable cause" - based search of 
defendant's cooler. He then began his evidence gathering mission 
wherein he observed "pinkish eyes," "shaking" and the so-called 
"mood swings." (Much of the latter actually occurring post-
arrest) . 
The trial court examined each of the factors, refused 
to consider the "refusal," pointed to the "innocent versus 
guilty" inferences to be made from the trooper's observations, 
stressed Deputy Roberts' opinion the Defendant was not impaired 
and made mention of factors that routinely give rise to DUI 
arrests which were absent in this case, i.e., driving pattern, 
slurred speech, imbalance, etc., and concluded that probable 
cause was lacking and that based upon the admissable evidence 
there was insufficient evidence to convict. 
This court will not disturb a decision of a court based 
upon the sufficiency of the evidence unless there was clear 
error. (See State v. Dronebury, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 [Utah 
1989]). 
The State takes specific exception to the court's 
finding that consumption of two beers is indicative of impair-
ment. "This conclusion is clearly erroneous." (Citing the lack 
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of evidence in the record to make such a conclusion.) (Appel-
lant's brief, p. 10) 
Such an assertion demonstrates the State's 
misunderstanding of its role in the adversary system - - the 
State has the burden of putting on evidence to convince the trier 
of fact of Defendant's impairment, if that's what it wishes to 
show. Now the State complains: "Since we put on no evidence of 
the effect of two beers on a person, the court cannot conclude 
that two beers is insufficient to produce impairment." 
Likewise, the State complains in its brief (p.10) that 
the court placed too great an emphasis on Deputy Roberts' excul-
patory testimony which was "not complete," etc. If Roberts had 
something else to say in aid of Appellant's case at trial, it 
seems logically prudent that the prosecutor should have asked him 
to say it at the time. 
In the final argument of the State's brief there is the 
recurring reference to Defendant's being an attorney, as if he 
should be held to a different standard, as espoused by Gustin 
herein. 
That the State would even make the above argument is 
disturbing. With all the references in the record to Mr. McRae's 
notoriety among the local police officers as a "DUI attorney" -
adversary as well as an "abrasive", "intimidating" character 
known to the officers to have a more than passing acquaintance 
with the grape, it is not unthinkable that Trooper Gustin seized 
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upon an opportunity to strike a blow against the "enemy camp" for 
less than genuine reasons. Judging from the clamor with which 
the prosecution herein has objected to the court's ruling in a 
relatively insignificant case (R. 12-27)/ (indeed Defendant 
submits that on no other occasion has the Duchesne County Attor-
ney's Office appealed an adverse ruling in a similar misdemeanor 
case), there is a strong indication that Defendant has been 
singled out because of who he his is or what he "makes his 
living" at (to quote Gustin) for extraordinary prosecution. 
The ruling of the court below re probable cause should 
not be disturbed. 
IV. A REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL IN THIS CASE WOULD 
BE ACADEMIC SINCE THE ROADBLOCK 
WAS UNLAWFUL 
The parties argued the legality of the roadblock stop 
which gave rise to this arrest before the trial court. The court 
found the roadblock to have been lawful. (R. 033, paragraph 1.) 
Defendant did not appeal the court's decision on the roadblock 
since he prevailed on other grounds and has not raised it here-
tofore because until this court's recent decision in State v. 
Sims, 156 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (Utah App. 1991), such an argument was 
unavailable to Defendant in light of existing law. 
This being a "Mangelson-type" roadblock, the State 
would be unable to survive a motion to suppress based solely on 
Sims grounds, (and/or State v. Park, Memorandum Decision, Case 
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No. 900260-CA [Utah App. April 10, 1991]); therefor, judicial 
economy dictates that this court, if necessary, dismiss this 
appeal for the aforesaid independent reasons* 
CONCLUSION 
The court should dismiss this appeal for the reason 
that Defendant has been once placed in jeopardy and acquitted. 
In the alternative, this court should affirm the 
decision below which found insufficient probable cause for Defen-
dant's arrest, generally, and more particularly concluded that an 
accused has a right to refuse to submit to field sobriety tests 
without a negative inference being derived therefrom. 
Finally, this court should dismiss this appeal, if 
necessary, on independent grounds, this being a "Mangelson-type" 
roadblock case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of May, 1991. 
LONIrF. DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT M. MCRAE, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS AND ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. £C|_-77?-57 
This matter came on for Trial on March 22, 1990. Herbert Wm. 
Gillespie appeared on behalf of the State. Harry H. Souvall 
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Defendant was not 
present and through his attorney, waived his right to be present. 
Judge Payne indicated that he was personally acquainted with 
the Defendant in this matter and offerred to recuse himself. Both 
parties, through there respective attorneys, requested that Judge 
Payne hear the case. 
Defendant made a Motion to Dismiss the case on the basis that 
the State had not provided material requested in the discovery 
process. The Court determined that the Discovery Request had not 
been made until March 21, 1990, and denied the Motion. 
Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss which was filed on 
June 27, 1989 based upon his claim that the law enforcement 
officer had no probable cause to stop Defendant, to arrest 
Defendant, or to search his vehicle. 
The Court determined that there had not been a Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion in the Justice Court, that the case had been 
transferred from the Justice Court to the Circuit Court without 
Trial, and that this was not an Appeal from a determination on the 
merits by the Justice Court. The parties stipulated that this 
matter would be treated as though it had been originally filed in 
the Circuit Court. At the request of the parties, the Court 
combined the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with the 
Trial on the merits and proceeded with the Trial. Based upon the 
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1. That Defendant was stopped at a highway road block 
pursuant to a planned operation which had been reduced to written 
form prior to being implemented. Defendant was stopped in 
accordance with the plan. There was no violation of the 
Defendant's rights with respect to being stopped at the road block 
and the Court finds that a reasonable suspicion existed which 
justified a brief investigatory detention after the initial stop. 
The Defendant was recognized by all law enforcement officers who 
dealt with him as being a prominent criminal defense attorney in 
this area. 
2. There was no evidence as to unusual or unsafe driving. 
The evidence indicated that the Defendant stopped his vehicle in 
compliance with the procedures in effect for the road block. 
After stopping his vehicle, the Defendant pulled his vehicle to 
the side of the road as instructed. The evidence indicates that 
the Defendant responded appropriately as he approached the road 
block, that he slowed and stopped at the road block as was 
indicated by the police officers, and that he pulled his vehicle 
to the side of the road in accordance with the request of the 
officers. 
3. Deputy Roberts of the Duchesne County Sheriffs 
Department was the initial officer who had contact with the 
Defendant after the Defendant had stopped at the road block. 
Deputy Roberts observed the odor of alcohol coming from the 
Defendant's breath and based upon that observation directed the 
Defendant to pull his vehicle to the side of the roadway for 
further investigation. 
4. Roberts then asked the Defendant to exit his vehicle and 
walk to the front of the vehicle. The Defendant did this as 
requested. At the front of the vehicle, the Defendant was 
requested to take a field sobriety test which the Defendant 
declined to take. 
5. After the discussion at the front of the Defendant's 
vehicle, the Defendant again walked back to his vehicle and 
reentered his car. 
6. During Deputy Roberts initial contact with the Defendant, 
he requested and received the Defendant's driver's license. 
Nothing unusual with respect to the production of the license was 
reported. 
7. The evidence clearly indicates that the Defendant 
understood the request and instructions of Deputy Roberts and 
responded appropriately to the same. 
8. The Defendant spoke in a normal speech pattern (that is 
there was no slurred speech). 
9. The Defendant's mental processes were not affected by the 
alcohol that he had consumed. Defendant was able to communicate 
with the officers in a normal fashion. 
10. Deputy Roberts, who was arguably in the best position to 
observe, did not report anything unusual in the ability of the 
Defendant to exit his vehicle/ walk to the front of his vehicle, 
stand while talking to Deputy Roberts at the front of his vehicle, 
walked back, and reentered the vehicle. 
11. Deputy Roberts did not place the Defendant under arrest 
nor testify that he had formed an opinion that the Defendant was 
in violation of the law prohibiting Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol. Indeed, at trial/ Deputy Roberts indicated that except 
for the odor of alcohol, there was no other indication that the 
Defendant was intoxicated . 
12. Trooper Gustin, of the Utah Highway Patrol, observed the 
Defendant at the road block and as the Defendant pulled his 
vehicle to the side of the road. Trooper Gustin was some distance 
from the Defendant's car when the Defendant exited his car. 
13. Trooper Gustin noted that the Defendant was unsteady as 
he walked (i.e. he lifted his legs higher than usual in walking 
and seemed to place his foot down carefully). Trooper Gustin did 
not report any other unusual conduct with respect to the 
Defendant's ability to stand or walk. 
14. After the Defendant returned to the vehicle, Deputy 
Roberts went over to Trooper Gustin and requested Trooper Gustin's 
help in the investigation. Deputy Roberts apparently believed 
Trooper Gustin (who has twenty years experience) to be more 
qualified to handle the investigation. Deputy Roberts informed 
Trooper Gustin that the Defendant had refused to take a field 
sobriety test. From that point on, Trooper Gustin dealt with the 
Defendant. Deputy Roberts had no further contact prior to the 
arrest of the Defendant. 
15. After Deputy Roberts left the Defendant, and while the 
Defendant was seated in his vehicle. Trooper Gustin had a 
converation with the Defendant. During that conversation, Trooper 
Gustin observed that the Defendant's hands were shaking. 
16. Defendant refused to cooperate with Trooper Gustin in 
taking a horizontal eye nystagmus test and was argumentative. 
17. Although Defendant was less than cooperative with Trooper 
Gustin, the evidence indicates clearly that he was able to 
converse with Trooper Gustin in a normal fashion (that is, there 
was no indication of impaired speech, inability to understand, or 
inability to communicate, etc.). 
18. During the interviews with the two officers, the 
Defendant indicated to each officer that he had consumed two 
beers. 
19. Based upon his observations of the Defendant, Trooper 
Gustin formed an opinion that the Defendant was in violation of 
the law with respect to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and 
placed the Defendant under arrest. 
20. The specific factual observations that Trooper Gustin 
relied upon forming his opinions were: 
A. The odor of alcohol. 
B. The Defendant's statement that he had consumed two 
beers. 
C. Trooper Gustin*s observation that the Defendant 
lifted his legs higher than normal and carefully put them down in 
walking to and from the front of the car. 
D. His observations that the Defendant's hands shook. 
E. The fact that the Defendant, who is a licensed 
attorney, refused to take a field sobriety test. (Trooper Gustin 
apparently believed that, because the Defendant was familiar with 
the purpose of a field sobriety test, his refusal to take the 
tests was an implied admission that he had consumed sufficient 
alcohol so that he could not pass the tests.) 
F. Pinkish eyes, erratic mood swings, and beer in the 
vehicle. 
20. Based upon the above, the Court finds that the Defendant 
had a right not to take the field sobriety tests and the exercise 
of that right cannot be construed as evidence of intoxication. 
21. There was no evidence submitted to the Court which would 
indicate that shaking hands are caused by the consumption of 
alcohol. Common experience suggests that there are many causes 
for shaking of the extremities which have nothing to do with the 
consumption of alcohol. Moreover, with respect to alcohol 
consumption, shaking is more often associated with non-consumption 
(that is the "shakes" often experienced by individuals who are 
dependent upon alcohol but who have not consumed the same). Based 
upon the evidence in this case, the Court concludes that the fact 
that the Defendant's hands shook is not probative of 
intoxication. The description of the Defendant's pinkish eyes, 
erratic mood swings, and beer in the vehicle as described, are 
also not highly suggestive of intoxication. 
22. In this type of case, what is not said is often as 
convincing to the Court as what is said. In this case, the 
Defendant was able to do many tasks which would indicate that he 
was not intoxicated within the meaning of the DUI statute. Among 
the indications of sobriety are: 
A. The fact that he was able to recognize the road block and 
respond appropriately to it; 
B. The fact that he was able to pull the vehicle to the side 
of the road as instructed by the officer; 
C. The fact that he was able to produce his driver's license 
without difficulty as requested; 
D. The fact that he was able to exit his vehicle, walk to 
the front of the car, stand and talk with Deputy Roberts, return 
and reenter the vehicle without great difficulty. 
(The Court does not doubt the observations of Trooper Gustin with 
respect to the Defendant's movements. However, in view of the 
fact that he was some distance from the event and in view of the 
fact that the unusual movement was apparently not noticed by 
Deputy Roberts, the Court concludes that the movements of the 
Defendant which were noted by Trooper Gustin were not highly 
suggestive of intoxication. Neither officer reported any 
staggering, any problem with upper body movement while standing, 
use of the vehicle for support, or other common actions of those 
who have been affected by the consumption of alcohol. Indeed, 
Deputy Roberts, who was arguably in the best position to observe, 
and who was undoubtedly looking for the effects of alcohol, did 
not report anything unusual with respect to the conduct of the 
Defendant while outside the vehicle.) 
E. The fact that the Defendant's speech pattern was not 
affected. 
F. The fact that the Defendant was obviously in control of 
his thought processes. The Defendant was able to understand and 
communicate with the officers. 
23. Based upon the testimony of Deputy Roberts, the Court 
concludes that he did not observe facts which would support 
probable cause to arrest. Indeed, in view of the close contact 
that Deputy Roberts had with the Defendant, his testimony could 
only support a finding that the Defendant was not intoxicated 
within the meaning of the DUI statute. 
24. As stated above, the Court is not convinced that the 
shaking of hands is indicative of intoxication. Further, as 
stated above, the fact that the Defendant refused to take the 
field sobriety tests is not evidence of intoxication, with 
respect to the remaining testimony of Trooper Gustin this Court is 
left with his observation that the Defendant smelled of alcohol, 
had blood shot eyes, the Defendant's admission that he consumed 
two beers, Trooper Gustin's observations concerning the 
Defendant's unusual walking, and his mood swings. As indicated at 
Trial, absent the testimony of Deputy Roberts, this Court may have 
been inclined to rely upon Trooper Gustin's obvious integrity in 
coming to the conclusion that the Defendant was intoxicated. The 
affects of alcohol upon the human body are often difficult to 
articulate. To some extent, a verbal description can not 
accurately describe what the officer has observed. There are many 
nuances which bespeak intoxication which cannot be adequately 
articulated. This Court would normally give weight to an 
officer's opinion that an individual was intoxicated in addition 
to the weight given to specific facts that the officer bases his 
opinion on. (In other words, the fact that a witness came to the 
conclusion that the Defendant is intoxicated has weight in 
addition to the specific facts which support an opinion). 
After having observed Trooper Gustin and listening to his 
testimony/ the Court is convinced that he honestly believed that 
the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol and acted in good 
faith in making this arrest. It is significant to note that he 
apparently did not have an opportunity to discuss his observations 
with Deputy Roberts and was not aware that Deputy Roberts had not 
observed anything unusual concerning the Defendant's walking. 
Therefore, he gave his observation of the Defendant's walking 
weight which, in view of Roberts' testimony, the Court cannot. 
In order to support an arrest, the Court must find facts 
which would justify a reasonable police officer to believe that a 
public offense had been committed in the officer's presence. In 
this case we have two officers who apparently came to different 
conclusions concerning the Defendant's condition. (Although 
Roberts did not affirmatively indicate that the Defendant was not 
intoxicated, no other conclusion would be supported by his 
testimony). While the observation of Trooper Gustin may have 
supported an arrest (if given the full weight of the 
observations), after considering the testimony of both officers, 
the Court concludes that probable cause for arrest did not exist. 
When there is a conflict in to the evidence, the trier of 
fact is given the duty to resolve the conflict and in doing so I 
conclude that a reasonable officer who observed the Defendant walk 
to and from his vehicle would not have found his movement highly 
suggestive of intoxication. The fact that Roberts did not observe 
the reported unusual steps and the fact that no other movement 
suggestive of intoxication (i.e. staggering steps, upper body 
movement, difficulty in exiting the vehicle, use of the vehicle as 
support) was reported, compel the Court to come to this conclusion. 
In ruling on this matter, it is not the intent of the 
undersigned that this matter will constitute res judicata in any 
other proceeding and to the extent the Court may limit its 
findings to this case, the Court's finding shall not consitute res 
judicata in any civil proceeding. This is especially true because 
the Court believes that the testimony of Roberts was not 
complete. In this matter the prosecution did not appear to rely 
at all upon Deputy Roberts on the issue of intoxication. It 
appeared to the Court that Roberts was called and testified to 
establish that the Defendant had operated the motor vehicle. As 
indicated above, the Court is compelled to conclude that Roberts 
did not believe that the Defendant was intoxicated. However, 
because the examination of Roberts was not extensive with respect 
to intoxication, the Court believes that res judicata with respect 
to the probable cause for arrest ought not to apply. 
Based upon the above/ the Court finds that probable cause for 
the arrest did not exist. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress all 
evidence which was gathered subsequent to the arrest is# 
therefore, granted. Based upon the evidence which was submitted 
to the Court prior to the arrest/ the Court finds reasonable doubt 
as to the crime charged and finds the Defendant not guilty. 
DATED this 14th of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNES CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
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